数据显示，滔搏营收从2020/21财年的360.1亿元下降至2022/23财年的270.7亿元，两年减少近90亿元；2021/22、2022/23两个财年，归母净利润分别同比下降约11.68%和24.93%；自2022/23财年以来，四个财年累计净关闭门店超过3300家。

1、人人体育 真正值得观察的，仍是其世界模型能否持续转化为稳定收入、真机表现和可复制的规模化交付。

为什么？ “以前投资亏了，可以说是市场风险，创业九死一生。人人体育他和拉马尔一样独一无二，我们必须90分钟全程保持警惕。

2、2026：风口上的脑机接口，能飞多高？

面对罗德里和法比安·鲁伊斯的绞杀，法国队“想抢抢不着，要传也传不过去”。

3、武磊：国家队生涯有收获有风雨，经历的一切都是最好的财富

AI消除、AI摘要、AI搜索、录音转写……功能列表越写越长。

4、换新球的间隔由9局缩短为7局，ATP新规则为何引发广泛讨论？

更值得玩味的是，就在特斯拉高调宣布奥斯汀全域覆盖无人驾驶服务的同日，有媒体披露，该市真正投入运营的Robotaxi车辆仅约20辆，且其FSD系统在上半年发生了17起已知事故。

5、以监督赋能保电攻坚 用坚守清凉江城盛夏——国网武汉供电公司汉口供电中心纪委从严开展迎峰度夏全维度一线督查工作_网易订阅

他们的下一个对手英格兰，同样经历了一场恶战。

如今，他们不仅以37场常规时间不败追平了意大利的国家队纪录，更带着欧洲杯冠军的底气，向队史第二座世界杯冠军发起冲击。

由于中场失控，前场外援只能陷入单打独斗，阵地战创造得分效率极低。

6、P&I将至，腾龙富士唯卓仕新镜头发布｜势力新鲜报

这些长线资金的配置行为，构成了一道看不见的底部支撑。

在这场新老两代天才的第11次正面对决中，亚马尔所在的球队再次笑到了最后。

7、15亿人次“挤爆”五一，旧旅游逻辑终于“死透”了

并不是所有潜在回报巨大的机会都具有凸性，凸性投资的失败概率较高，也不适合情绪较大起伏的投资者。

但也正因如此，普通家庭的孩子更该主动补这张网。

8、赤影掠场，破局由你——Wilson威尔胜正式发布全新Defyer系列

两队都已经提前出线，这场比赛的意义在于争夺小组第一。

综合来看，葡萄牙在硬实力上占据绝对优势，首轮被逼平后第二轮战意强烈，必须全取三分才能确保出线主动权。

然而，在这届被寄予厚望的美加墨之夏，他个人的8粒进球虽与梅西并列射手榜首位，却终究换不来一张决赛门票。

9、最高400亿 万亿宁王发布A股史上最大股票回购方案｜盘后公告集锦

仍以天齐锂业为例，2025年上半年，公司归母净利润仅录得8441.06万元，扣非净利润132万元，这一盈利水平仅好于亏损的2020年和2024年。

汽车交付量也重回增长轨道，二季度交付480,126辆，一扫此前的阴霾。

10、不期而遇！男篮球员现身中国石油加油站

亚洲区大洗牌：印尼入围，国足位列第13 在亚洲区12个名额的预测名单中，传统强队日本、韩国、伊朗、澳大利亚、沙特、卡塔尔以及乌兹别克斯坦、伊拉克、约旦毫无悬念地占据一席之地。

”他接着说，“我们必须重新站起来，没有别的路。

1、现代快报：佩德里将为苏州vs无锡开球，此前他刚获世界杯冠军

年轻中卫彭啸在对抗与预判上严重不足，上半场的两个丢球均与其失位、漏人直接相关，下半场更是被外援单点生吃，最终在第59分钟被老将郑铮换下止损。

2、多家中小银行挂牌出售村镇银行控股权

首先是过度依赖萨拉赫，一旦他被限制或状态不佳，埃及的进攻效率就会大幅下降。

3、耐克自砍一刀，但安踏的作业不好抄

弗里克还希望挖掘两人的无球跑动能力，这可以在不削弱球队创造力的前提下"解放"——而非替代——亚马尔，让他把更多精力投入到组织进攻中。高通第五代骁龙8至尊版：3nm制程全面升级，终端侧AI是亮点无论终场哨响后比分如何，马竞都已经在这场足坛盛宴中，赢得了最响亮的掌声。

4、12岁俄罗斯少女双眼形态失衡，睁眼费力、瞳孔被遮挡，医生攻克高难度上睑下垂修复

伊纳西奥作为左脚中卫，具备后场长传和持球推进能力，恰好弥补米兰现有后卫出球薄弱的短板，是阿莫林三中卫体系的理想左中卫人选。

5、表现亮眼！第4局带队连得6分，实现反超，球迷：赵勇该让她打主力

不过加纳也有自己的优势。

6、纳指、标普面临周线“背靠背”连跌 油价涨势暂歇

7月1日到22日，紫光股份股价累计上涨58%，浪潮信息上涨41%。

2023年3月，膝伤又让他休战约一个月，关键联赛和国王杯比赛均未赶上。

报告期内，公司铝水的采购价格波动与公开市场价格变动趋势基本保持一致。

7、两个史上最伟大14号的旷世之撕

时钟上，相隔十分钟。

他们不再满足于“养老院”的标签，而是真金白银地购买即战力与未来潜力。

8、中国男篮最新集训名单！上海小将首次入选，赵睿+张镇麟继续缺席

同时，他的传中质量也相当不错，能够为禁区内的队友创造得分机会。

无论最终身着何种战袍，周四的亚特兰大注定将见证一场载入史册的激战。

（文｜出海参考，作者｜王璐，编辑｜罗文琴）Nextfin News — On July 22, latest research from Omdia showed that despite total market shipments dropping by over ten percent in the second quarter, Vivo—excluding its iQOO sub-brand—maintained its top position in the Indian smartphone market with 6.3 million units shipped. Yet despite its strength in the market, Vivo was unable to keep full control over its manufacturing plants in India. There is an unwritten law in the corporate world that market share acts as a moat and scale brings bargaining power. But in India, Vivo has just seen that principle turned on its head—and in a remarkably brutal fashion. On July 9, an official approval was finally granted. Dixon Technologies announced to the stock exchange that Vivo India received a clearance letter issued on July 8 by India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Under this approval, the manufacturing operations Vivo built over twelve years in India will formally be folded into a joint venture controlled fifty-one percent by a local partner. According to industry analyses, the new entity has a paid-up capital of just fifty million rupees—around three and a half million yuan—yet it is taking over a mega-factory designed for an annual capacity of over one hundred million units and backed by a workforce of more than ten thousand employees. Viewed in isolation, this transaction reads like a story of loss. But when placed back into the context of Vivo’s global footprint, its true nature changes entirely. India remains Vivo’s largest overseas market, ranking first in 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, accounting for roughly one-third of the brand's total global volume. Overseas operations already contribute more than half of Vivo's global revenue, with targets set to raise that share to sixty percent this year and seventy percent by 2027. This shift in India does not merely affect a single regional market; it alters the structural load-bearing pillar of Vivo’s entire global strategy. With the Indian chapter coming to a close, Vivo now faces far more practical questions about its future: What exactly did this equity restructuring change, and how will the brand navigate its next phase of globalization? A Three-and-a-Half-Million Yuan Outlay for a Three-Hundred-Billion Revenue Business By securing a fifty-one percent controlling stake, Dixon leveraged its position to capture a cash cow with an annual revenue potential estimated between two hundred fifty billion and three hundred billion rupees—roughly twenty-one billion to twenty-five billion yuan. This revenue guidance originates directly from Dixon’s own management team. As early as May, Dixon founder Sunil Vachani revealed that the joint venture would handle approximately two-thirds of Vivo’s smartphone sales in India, representing over twenty million units annually. JPMorgan further projects that the joint venture will add around eleven million smartphone shipments in fiscal year 2027, scaling up to approximately twenty-two million units annually across fiscal years 2028 and 2029. From India's perspective, this outcome represents a decisive policy victory. Looking back at Vivo’s expansion abroad, its capital deployment in India consisted of substantial physical investments. According to an official press release issued by Vivo India in April 2023, the company outlined a total investment plan of seventy-five billion rupees. The first phase called for thirty-five billion rupees by the end of 2023, of which twenty-four billion had already been allocated alongside plans to inject an additional eleven billion rupees by year-end. The new facility in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, spans roughly 169 acres—a site acquired back in 2018 that officially went into operation in mid-2024. It currently holds an annual production capacity of sixty million units, with plans to double that figure to one hundred twenty million upon full completion, rivaling the footprint of Samsung’s largest manufacturing plant in the country. By 2018, Vivo's earlier facility was already generating a monthly output of around one million units while employing nearly ten thousand local workers. What do these figures truly signify? They demonstrate that Vivo was never just a consumer brand in India; it had built an end-to-end manufacturing system, a local supply chain, and a massive employment ecosystem. The company replicated its battle-tested Chinese ground-sales model across India, extending from major metropolitan shopping centers down to rural retail shops across roughly seventy thousand touchpoints. It even transformed India into an export hub, shipping Indian-made smartphones to Thailand and Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2022, with export targets exceeding one million units in 2023. Yet after 2024, every one of these capital investments transformed into a distinct disadvantage at the negotiating table. Faced with mounting regulatory pressure, Vivo initiated discussions in 2024 with major domestic players including Tata Group, Murugappa Group, and Dixon Technologies to explore joint ventures or contract manufacturing options, though early negotiations stalled. In December 2024, Vivo signed a non-binding term sheet with Dixon Technologies, initiating a protracted government approval process that dragged on for nineteen months. Upon closing, the joint venture will purchase selected manufacturing assets from Vivo for an undisclosed amount, sign dedicated production and packaging agreements with Vivo India, handle a substantial share of its OEM orders, and retain the flexibility to manufacture for third-party brands down the line. With an initial capital commitment of just 25.5 million rupees, Dixon gains access to established assembly lines, skilled workers, an integrated supply chain, and guaranteed orders from a brand selling over thirty million phones a year. In return, Vivo retains only the right to continue selling smartphones in the Indian market alongside a forty-nine percent financial yield on equity. Using a newly incorporated entity with a registered capital of merely fifty million rupees to take control of an advanced industrial plant capable of producing over one hundred million units annually is virtually unprecedented in global business history. Vivo understood the gravity of the concessions, but faced with severe regulatory constraints, it was left with few alternatives. Why Did Stronger Sales Lead to Heavier Constraints? Under standard market conditions, Vivo’s operational execution in India was textbook perfect. According to data from market research firm Omdia, Vivo—excluding iQOO—led the Indian smartphone market throughout 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, marking a nineteen percent year-over-year growth rate. Samsung trailed in second place with twenty-three million units and a fifteen percent share. By the fourth quarter, Vivo widened its lead even further, shipping 7.9 million units in a single quarter to capture twenty-three percent of the market. Securing the top spot in the world's second-largest smartphone market—a region absorbing roughly one hundred fifty-four million devices annually—should have been a landmark corporate victory after twelve years of dedicated effort. However, as policy priorities shifted unexpectedly, the very capital-heavy assets Vivo spent years building transformed into immobilized leverage against the company. In April 2020, India enacted Press Note 3, requiring case-by-case government review for all direct foreign investments originating from countries sharing a land border. This rule effectively blocked capital injection channels for Chinese entities. Over the following years, regulatory scrutiny targeting Chinese smartphone manufacturers steadily intensified. In July 2022, authorities accused Vivo India of illicitly remitting 624.76 billion rupees back to China under the guise of tax avoidance. Vivo was hardly the only brand reshaped by this changing regulatory framework. Enforcement agencies froze 55.51 billion rupees of Xiaomi India’s assets in a dispute that remains unresolved; OPPO received a customs tax demand totaling 43.89 billion rupees; Transsion's manufacturing subsidiary, Ismartu India, surrendered a 50.1 percent controlling stake to Dixon; and HKC’s joint venture with Dixon was approved under a seventy-four to twenty-six equity structure. Faced with these conditions, Vivo was forced into a harsh binary choice: abandon its sunk costs and hand over billions of rupees in physical plants and distribution networks, or accept majority control by a local partner in exchange for permission to remain in the market. The restructuring struck directly at the primary engine of Vivo’s international business. India is not just another regional market for Vivo; it is its largest overseas pillar. In March of last year during the Boao Forum for Asia, Vivo COO Hu Baishan emphasized two key realities to Bloomberg: India is Vivo's most critical international market, and with overseas sales contributing over half of total revenues, the company is aiming for sixty percent in 2026 and seventy percent by 2027. In essence, the restructuring in India does not just adjust a local subsidiary; it alters the foundational premise of Vivo’s global expansion story. The "deep localization" playbook—building local plants, hiring local workforces, and cultivating local component ecosystems—long viewed as an ideal blueprint for overseas expansion, saw its ownership structure unilaterally rewritten in its most prominent market. Without Direct Plant Ownership in India, How Will Vivo Secure One-Third of Its Global Footprint? From a strategic standpoint, Vivo officially characterizes its international methodology as "More Local, More Global." The strategy relies on manufacturing localization through plants in markets like India and Brazil; marketing localization via major cultural partnerships ranging from the Indian Premier League to official sponsorships at the UEFA European Championship; and channel localization by exporting its field-sales distribution networks. The effectiveness of this approach is undeniable, as evidenced by Vivo holding the top market position in both India and Indonesia. Yet Vivo’s challenges in India expose the inherent vulnerabilities of this model: an over-concentration in specific regional markets and the property-rights risk associated with capital-heavy physical infrastructure. Pushing "More Local" to its logical extreme means anchoring factories, workforces, and supply chain assets entirely within foreign legal jurisdictions. Under favorable conditions, these assets form competitive barriers; during regulatory shifts, they turn into operational exposure. The deeper Vivo planted its roots in India over twelve years, the less leverage it retained during structural negotiations. Another challenge lies in Vivo's limited footprint across premium segments and developed Western markets. In discussions with Bloomberg, Hu Baishan noted that Vivo has paused expansion into developed regions like the United States and Western Europe, where carrier channels and Apple hold dominant positions, preferring instead to consider entering via new product categories over a three-to-five-year horizon. In India, the focus shifts toward expanding presence in the premium segment above six hundred dollars. In short, Vivo’s international expansion remains focused primarily on mid-to-entry segments across emerging markets, offering thinner profit margins. A six percent decline in Southeast Asian regional shipments in 2025 serves as a clear reminder of these market dynamics. So where does the company go from here? Part of the answer is already visible in Vivo’s recent strategic adjustments. First, Vivo is reframing its presence in India, shifting from a direct asset-owning manufacturer to a brand, technology, and distribution coordinator. This setup preserves market share, protects cash flow, maintains a forty-nine percent financial yield, and allows its premium product plans to proceed as intended. This structural pivot is not mere external speculation; it is explicitly defined by the mechanics of the joint venture agreement. According to regulatory filings submitted by Dixon, the joint venture is mandated to carry out three specific operational functions: acquire selected manufacturing assets from Vivo, execute contract manufacturing and packaging agreements with Vivo India, and fulfill OEM orders—initially covering roughly two-thirds of Vivo’s local sales volume before opening up capacity to third-party brands. In other words, the joint venture functions as a contract manufacturer, while product R&D, branding, pricing strategy, and retail distribution remain controlled by Vivo India. Holding a forty-nine percent equity stake, Vivo transitions to an equity accounting model rather than full revenue consolidation while retaining proportional board representation to safeguard its governance voice. Simply put: manufacturing operations transfer to a locally controlled partner, while the commercial brand and retail business remain firmly in Vivo's hands. Maintaining market leadership, preserving operational cash flow, and collecting a forty-nine percent share of manufacturing profits represents a practical compromise designed to minimize disruption. Second, Vivo is actively establishing a multi-hub manufacturing and brand strategy. In late May 2025, Vivo launched its product line in São Paulo, Brazil, under the Jovi sub-brand name. Because the "Vivo" trademark was already registered by local telecom operator Telefônica, the company adapted by entering under an alternate brand identity. Manufacturing was assigned to a local partner, GBR, with production lines established in the Manaus Free Trade Zone that went operational in January 2025. Complemented by established market positions in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Latin America is emerging as Vivo's next core strategic region. The Brazilian operating model serves as a template tailored for the post-India era: brand names can adapt, manufacturing can be outsourced to regional assembly partners, and market entry moves forward without exposing heavy physical assets to single-jurisdiction legal risk. The experience in India delivers a clear lesson on corporate asset ownership: deep operational localization alone is no longer an absolute defense, making governance structure and geographic diversification essential indicators of long-term resilience.7月24日，旭阳新材IPO即将上会。

早在八分之一决赛对阵葡萄牙时，巴黎圣日耳曼的强力边卫努诺·门德斯在与亚马尔缠斗了六十多分钟后，也不得不提前离场。